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Civil society associations, including voluntary 
and community groups, trade unions, faith-
based organisations, co-operatives and 
mutuals, have long influenced the economy.
Civil society associations can run businesses and they 
can run organisations that aim to influence businesses. 
Together, these two sorts of association help to grow a 
civil economy. This paper reviews the history of the civil 
economy and looks ahead to how it may come to have a 
greater influence in the future.
During industrialisation, many civil society associations 
were of a heavily economic character – notably friendly 
societies, mutual insurers, retail, saving and agricultural co-
operatives and trade unions. These achieved considerable 
economic influence, dominating some industries and 
counting their members in millions – indeed, in parts of the 
country in its heyday, a third of households were members 
of ‘the Co-op’. Civil society associations were often 
rooted in social movements, promoting and reproducing 
distinctive values. Though self-sufficient, they had to 
engage with government – both as a precondition for their 
success and as a consequence of it.
While friendly societies were practically extinguished by 
the post-war welfare state, the other classic forms of the 
civil economy have continued to be influential, suffering 
relative decline (and/or demutualisation) in some cases, 
but consolidation and renewal in others. The co-operative 
and trade union movements still count their members in 
millions. Moreover, during the last 50 years, many new 
forms of civil society engagement in economic activity 
have emerged: the ‘third sector’ has grown rapidly 
as part of a search for better ways of delivering the 
‘growth industries’ of health, social care and other public 
services; the environmental movement has given rise 
to green businesses and many new campaigning and 
certification bodies (as has the trade justice movement); 
and information and communication technologies have 
given rise both to new forms of productive activity (the 
open source movement) and new ways of organising. The 
last 30 years may have been the era of the market and the 
multinational corporation, but the foundations for a much 
stronger civil economy were also being laid. 
But what benefits do these economically focused civil 
society associations bring? How do they achieve them? 
When and why might they warrant some public support? 
One answer is in terms of diffuse general benefits – for 
example, building social capital and strengthening a 
progressive normative environment (the precondition for 
reforming business behaviour). A stronger, more specific 
answer is that the presence of civil society associations 
in a given field or market will often be important because 
of their impact on the way that industry evolves. Such 
impacts are specific to particular times and contexts, but 
it is possible to distinguish (and give examples of) some of 
the main ways they are realised. These include providing 
beneficial competition, a form of regulation, a source of 
innovation, pluralism in the provision of large-scale public 
services or simply valuable alleviation of economic hardship 
during times of restructuring. 
National and international experience suggests that, 
where forms of social enterprise prosper, they build up 
their own support infrastructures and also influence the 
public authorities to dismantle legal barriers, recognise the 
beneficial side-effects of social enterprise business models, 
support appropriate training provision and regulation, 
and ensure access to contracts and business services. 
When they succeed, the growth process is interactive and 
cumulative, with civil society associations gradually being 
able to modify or shape the institutional environment as 
their economic standing, technical expertise, social and 
political alliances, and popular legitimacy all accumulate. 
Currently, a wide range of civil society initiatives exists in 
all the major areas of societal concern – including retail 
supply chains, the financial system, carbon reduction 
and energy production, health and social care, the media 
and the arms industry. Some offer ethical alternatives 
in industries where corporate providers have frequently 
been shown to be untrustworthy or complicit in socially 
or environmentally damaging practices. In doing so, they 
address matters of widely acknowledged public concern – 
for example, deforestation and poverty in the global south 
– with the potential to command broad and deep support. 
Others raise awareness on emerging issues. Moreover, 
trends towards more distributed leadership, networked 
governance and online collaboration give grounds for 
cautious optimism.
Executive summary
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However, the development of a more civil economy will 
require that the initiatives mentioned above, as well as 
numerous other new social movements find expression 
and take root. For them to do so, a number of things will 
be necessary: first, the development of strong horizontal 
links among a plethora of grassroots groups to allow them 
to work together effectively. Second, the development of 
vertical links. There is a role for civil society as the convener 
or broker of complex, multi-party initiatives. At the highest 
level, these might involve both national and international 
public bodies as well as multinational companies and 
campaigning non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
More locally, it might involve bigger civil society associations 
acting as lead contractor or key intermediary in partnerships 
involving a number of small civil society associations and a 
public authority. 
This will require an organisational capacity which has often 
been missing from the sector. However, there are some 
signs that point to where such organisation and leadership 
might come from. There are the new means of organising 
offered by the web. Second, partly as a result of this, more 
direct methods of activism are on the rise. Finally, there is a 
large pool of underemployed or unemployed talent among 
the so-called third-age group.
Civil society associations acting alone will not succeed in 
creating a civil economy. Relationships with government 
will be critical and pose a particular challenge, since the 
development of a stronger and broader civil economy will 
require both a strong state, setting and resetting the ground 
rules for economic activity in different industries, and a more 
restrained state, one that is less active as a provider and 
manager of services. This will involve a difficult balancing act. 
Only governments can legislate to provide the necessary 
conditions for a civil economy to prosper and can act to 
ensure a fair field for civil society associations. At the same 
time, they need to be able to see when not to interfere and 
to allow civil society economic initiatives the room they need 
to grow and flourish.
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The purpose of this paper is to stimulate 
discussion about the possibilities for 
civil society to play an expanded and 
more influential role in the economy of 
the UK and Ireland in the future. 
Civil society associations can be active in the economic 
sphere in two ways. The first is through business 
organisations run under associational governance – for 
example, co-operatives, credit unions and other social 
enterprises. The second way is through associations that 
aim to influence the business or economic decision-making 
of others – for example, trade unions and campaigning 
voluntary organisations and NGOs. In this paper, the term 
civil society association is used to refer to both these 
types of initiative: civil society businesses and business 
influencers. 
The civil economy is where civil society and the economy 
overlap. It is those parts of civil society that are concerned 
with and engaged in economic activity. Equally, it is 
those areas of economic life embedded in or noticeably 
influenced by civil society activity. Appendix 1 offers a short 
primer on the terminology of this territory.
This paper starts by looking back to demonstrate that, 
historically, civil society had a massive economic presence. 
In doing so it introduces the ‘classic’ forms of the civil 
economy: friendly societies, mutual societies, co-operatives 
and trade unions. Part 2 then looks at the current situation, 
noting relative decline in some spheres, but also a wide 
range of new developments. 
Parts 1-2 are concerned with experience in the UK and 
Ireland. Part 3 introduces some international examples and 
comparisons. Along with material provided in the previous 
sections, these are used to help explore an important 
issue: how much influence can civil society associations 
have in the economic sphere and how is it achieved? 
This leads to a discussion of the way civil society and 
public policy interact, to affect the evolution of industries, 
institutions and economic governance. 
That more analytic job done, Part 4 looks ahead to the 
prospects for the growth of a civil economy. It offers an 
overview of the main areas in which societal challenges 
are obvious and civil society associations are already 
emerging as important actors. It draws on a workshop 
which imagined how civil society might come to be much 
more influential in the economic sphere, the thinking of 
which is summarised in Appendix 2. It then goes on to 
consider some of the preconditions for such a build-up of 
civil society ‘muscle’ in the body economic.
Finally, while acknowledging that economic engagement 
is no more a panacea than other approaches to social 
change, Part 5 speculates briefly that the idea of a civil 
economy may nevertheless be useful as offering a banner 
under which efforts to affect societal evolution, of many 
sorts and at all levels, might comfortably congregate and 
find some measure of common cause. 
Introduction
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The contribution of civil society activity and the forms 
it took during industrialisation were often of a heavily 
economic character. Indeed, the differentiation between the 
private and the social sectors is itself relatively recent. 
In Adam Smith’s day and before, civil society was an 
expression that encompassed business enterprises and 
occupational associations (merchant companies, guilds, 
friendly societies) as well as civic and learned societies, 
trust-endowed schools, colleges and alms houses, and 
religious bodies. Their shared characteristic – and often 
concern – was independence from the state and the 
capacity to direct their own affairs. 
As Bakan (2004) notes, the differentiation between the 
economic and the social spheres, and the gradual emergence 
of the corporation as a legal form, took many years. 
Table 1 summarises some of the principal areas of civil 
society activity during this period. It is constructed to 
highlight the broad areas in which people were confronted 
by pressing issues; the ways in which they acted together, 
in doing so evolving progressively more effective and 
organised responses; and the lasting legacy of these 
initiatives, from which society still benefits. 
Predominantly, the pressing issues concerned basic  
needs – for food, income security, health and housing. 
Friendly societies, found across Europe from the 17th and 
18th centuries onwards but with roots going back much 
earlier, were important in their own right as well as being 
the starting point for other initiatives. Beyond a strong 
social dimension, their main economic function was as a 
form of insurance against unemployment, sickness and 
death (funeral benefits and widows’ pensions). Members 
would pay small monthly or weekly amounts into the 
common fund of their independent local society. In the 
19th century, the movement grew rapidly and became 
dominated by national and international societies with 
networks of quasi-independent local societies affiliated 
to national grand lodges. The most notable of these 
‘affiliated orders’ were the Oddfellows, the Ancient Order 
of Foresters and the Independent Order of Rechabites 
(a temperance order). An estimated 925,000 members 
in 1815 had increased by 1898 to around 4.2 million 
members of registered societies (Gilbert, 1966). Their 
importance was increasingly valued and, under the 1911 
National Insurance Act, they became an important part of 
the first national social insurance system. 
1Part 1: Civil society and the economy in the transition  to modernity
Table 1: Civil society activity and the economy during the transition to modernity
Societal or community 
problem
Civil society responses  
and organisational forms
Institutional legacy
Slavery and\the slave trade Campaigning to express moral outrage; court 
action to free those in slavery; economic boycott; 
campaign in Parliament.
Human rights legislation; economic sanctions.
Adulterated food, fire, illness 
and other hazards
Mutual aid in buying food; group saving and 
loan schemes; mutual insurance; economic 
organisations under associational governance.
Worldwide co-operative movements; friendly  
and building societies; distinct legal frameworks.
Insecure and oppressive 
workplaces
Labour organisers mobilising for collective  
action; emergence of trade unions generating 
public and club goods.
Labour movement; health and safety legislation; 
employment law, the International Labour 
Organisation.
Housing and public health 
in cities
Progressive paternalism; Quaker 
entrepreneurialism; progressive charities; the 
‘garden cities’ movement.
Progressive business tradition; progressive  
grant-making; housing associations.
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The emergence of the mutual insurance industry was a 
related, parallel development providing fire or life cover 
for wealthier individuals, and marine and fire insurance for 
businesses. According to one authority: ‘For most of the 
eighteenth century, three London mutuals – the Hand-in-
Hand, founded in 1696, the Union, founded in 1714, and 
the Westminster, founded in 1717 stood alongside the 
two chartered corporations (Royal Exchange Assurance 
and London Assurance), and one private stock company 
(Sun), as the dominant fire insurers in the kingdom. Recent 
estimates suggest that the three mutual offices together 
accounted for over half of all receipts from fire underwriting 
in the capital for the first two-thirds of the century.’  
(Pearson, 2002, pp. 2-3).
While particular societies waxed and waned, the mutual 
form continued to be a very prominent part of the UK 
insurance industry through the era of industrialisation and 
beyond. It appears particularly well suited to situations 
requiring a long-term trusting relationship under conditions 
of uncertainty. By making customers also owners, conflicts 
of interest and opportunistic behaviour can be resolved and 
contained more easily.
Consumer co-operatives started forming in the early 
1800s as a way for members to obtain unadulterated 
food at reasonable prices. Some started as variants of 
friendly societies or as offshoots of craft guilds; they were 
assisted from 1828 onwards by the practical, Owenite1 
publication The Co-operator. Then, in 1844, the Rochdale 
Society of Equitable Pioneers was founded, with its 
succinct statement of well thought-out core principles. This 
is generally taken as the moment of lift-off: the number 
and size of societies grew and they began to link up. 
Forty years later, more than a thousand were operating 
with some 700,000 members. The number of societies 
continued to increase for another 20 years, but already 
the real growth was in their size. Co-operatives came to 
dominate the retail sector and, through the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society, developed a powerful presence right 
through the supply chain, down to canneries and farms. In 
terms of membership, this had risen by the second world 
war, to some 8.5 million (Cole, 1944). More strikingly, the 
proportion of co-operators in the population ranged from a 
mere 10% in South Wales (‘a desert’, according to Cole), 
to 25% in Yorkshire and Lancashire and 29% across the 
north of England. 
The building societies movement was another offshoot 
of friendly societies, initially as ‘terminating’ societies 
(members helped each other buy houses, until they were 
all homeowners, at which point the club closed down), 
and then from 1845 onwards increasingly as ‘permanent’ 
societies. Every town of any size came to have its 
own building society and, in 1860, there were 750 in 
London alone. At the outbreak of the second world war 
they provided more than two-thirds of UK institutional 
mortgage lending. While many facilitated home-ownership 
among the middle classes, some (notably Co-operative 
Permanent) successfully enabled working people to buy 
homes (Samy, 2008). 
The co-operative form also met the needs of small farmers 
who were dependent on suppliers for inputs, and grain 
merchants, creameries and so on to sell and process 
many of their outputs. At a time when travel and transport 
were more difficult, these suppliers and merchants often 
became, in effect, local monopolies or local monopsonies 
(a market situation in which there is only one buyer), 
capturing a disproportionate share of the value created 
at the expense of the primary producers. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the co-operative form appealed to farmers. In 
Ireland they spread rapidly after the first one was started 
in 1889. By 1900 there were 374, and by 1913, almost 
1,000. Starting initially as co-operative creameries, most 
soon diversified into multi-purpose agricultural societies, 
supplying inputs as well as processing outputs and 
providing insurance. 
The years between 1880 and the outbreak of the first 
world war also saw a growth spurt by the trade union 
movement (by then their legal status had been more or less 
regularised). Numbers rose from three-quarters of a million 
to more than four million. The movement broadened out 
from its origins in craft unions imbued with nonconformism 
(another important movement in civil society) and self-help 
ideas (which found further expression in the mechanics’ 
institutes and the Workers’ Educational Association). It 
came to encompass semi-skilled and unskilled workers, 
who were more exposed to harsh and dangerous factory 
conditions and were increasingly influenced by socialist 
ideas. Whereas craft unions operated by controlling entry 
to particular trades in order to protect the terms and 
conditions of their work, unions representing semi-skilled 
and unskilled workers used collective bargaining with 
employers as the means to regulate terms and conditions 
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of work. During this period, too, trades councils were 
formed, leading in due course to the formation of both the 
Labour Representation Committee (later the Labour Party) 
and the Trades Union Congress. Trade unions, like friendly 
societies, also provided services such as unemployment 
benefit for their members. 
These sketches are enough to show that civil society 
associations were integral to the development of the 
modern economy. Within several key industries – retailing, 
agriculture and financial services – civil society associations 
became a powerful, even dominant, presence. Other civil 
society associations provided basic social security and 
upheld progressive values in ways that variously supported, 
constrained and conditioned industrial development and 
the norms of business behaviour. 
Three aspects of these developments are worth 
underlining. First, the success of early initiatives was 
far from certain: many failed, and it took time to evolve 
operating practices and arrangements that worked 
practically and socially and that could be imitated 
across the country. ‘Innovation’ is an accolade awarded 
retrospectively to the minority of attempts to do things 
differently that succeed. 
Secondly, much civil society activity was associated with 
social or religious movements of one sort or another. Some 
major elements of the Victorian and Edwardian social 
sector (for example, the global temperance movement) 
have either shrunk or taken different forms, as social 
problems have taken new forms. But others, smaller and 
less visible at the time, have grown steadily (for example, 
housing associations, first developed by campaigners 
such as Octavia Hill). Often, successful civil society 
initiatives produced social movements as well as practical 
arrangements to tackle specific issues. The balance of 
contributions (in time and money) to likely benefits will have 
been important for potential participants in the decision to 
join. For poorer people especially, this calculation and the 
associated risks will often have been difficult decisions. 
The decision may have been made easier, and stronger 
and more enduring bonds created, when membership was 
not a purely instrumental relationship. Hence, although 
‘economic’ in character, the moral dimension, shown 
in concerns for human dignity, self-improvement and 
social solidarity, are also a marked characteristic of civil 
society activity during this period. The blend of moral and 
economic concerns varied – from the overwhelmingly 
financial attractions of mutual insurance, to the essentially 
moral impulse behind campaigning against the slave 
trade and slavery. But, arguably, the combination of 
practical problem-solving with the gradual articulation of a 
broader social or moral purpose explains how civil society 
associations in some areas built up into identifiable social 
movements with enduring legacies. The often mundane 
work of administering membership and governance, or 
savings and loans, or overseeing staff, was embedded in, 
and upheld by, a distinctive world view and normative order. 
Finally, it is also clear that although these movements 
focused on their own specific activities and contexts, 
they also engaged with government and the democratic 
process. This was necessary to create appropriate legal 
forms and safeguards, and also to effect specific legal 
changes. For example, British trade unions had for years 
been inclined to eschew political activity, relying on their 
industrial muscle and collective bargaining to establish and 
enforce work regulation. Nevertheless, after a number of 
court cases had gone against the trade union movement 
(particularly the Taff Vale Case of 1901, which held trade 
unions liable for employer losses during industrial action), 
political activity was necessary to seek legislative changes. 
So these adverse legal rulings gave impetus to the ‘political 
arm’ of the movement – the Labour Party.
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Engagement with government was also a consequence 
of the movements’ success. The development of friendly 
societies after the 1911 National Insurance Act shows this 
clearly. The government gave them a key role as approved 
societies for collecting contributions to a national social 
insurance system. The other approved societies were 
trade unions, employers’ provident funds, and industrial 
life offices (non-profit subsidiaries set up by companies, 
such as Prudential Assurance, to gain approved status 
and thereby establish relationships with people who could 
then be sold other financial services). Table 2 shows what 
happened after the passing of the 1911 Act. Centralised 
friendly societies – those without local branches – and 
industrial life offices grew, while the friendly societies with 
affiliated branches and trade-union-run societies declined 
in their share of total membership. 
So although, overall, friendly society membership 
increased from 5.76 million to 8.14 million members, 
tight government regulation meant that the membership 
dynamic was undermined: the distribution of any surplus 
was proscribed and the societies’ capacity to manage 
their finances responsibly was limited by government 
scrutiny, increasing powers to intervene and declining state 
subsidies to the social insurance system. As Beveridge 
(1942) observed, some regarded the post-1911 partnership 
between the state and the friendly societies to be a form 
of creeping nationalisation, during which they lost some of 
their core values and practices.
Table 2: The relative decline of locally managed insurance 
following the National Insurance Act (1911)
 
Approved* society
% Market share
1912 1938
Industrial life offices 41.5 47
Friendly societies without branches 22.8 28
Friendly societies with branches 23.7 16.5
Trade unions 11.4 8
Employers’ provident funds 0.5 0.4
Total membership 12,390,000 18,170,000
* For the collection of NI contributions
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In more recent times, the role of civil society associations in 
the economy becomes more varied and uneven. A simple 
way of reviewing this disparate experience is in terms of 
continuity and change. Continuity is represented by the 
decline, reorientation and further spread of the ‘classic’ 
forms of civil society economic activity discussed in the 
previous chapter. Change is manifest in the upsurge of 
innovative civil society initiatives in response to new socio-
economic challenges and concerns.
The classic forms of civil  
society activity 
The development of the welfare state in Britain precipitated 
a rapid decline in the number of friendly societies and in the 
nature and scale of their activities. Co-operatives, mutuals and 
trade unions have fared much better. The food arm of the Co-
operative Group remains the fifth largest supermarket chain 
in the country, and it is a particularly strong player in some 
other sectors (especially funeral homes and travel agents). 
It still has more than 10 million members, its membership 
is increasing, and, through the Co-operative Party, it is well 
represented in Parliament. While demutualisation in the 
late 1990s reduced the scale of building society activity, 
reports at that time of the sector’s imminent demise were 
unfounded. The carpetbaggers were resisted both within 
societies and politically through legislation that removed the 
opportunity that the 1986 Building Societies Act had created. 
Extrapolating from the most recent public statistics on market 
share, it seems that building societies have about 18% of 
mortgage lending in the UK. This is about half the share held 
by independent banks, with publicly owned – that is, failed – 
banks having the remaining 45% of the market.
In Ireland, co-operatives have grown to dominate agricultural 
services. According to McCarthy et al. (undated), by 1995, the 
membership of the country’s 36 dairy co-operatives stood at 
almost 90,000 and they directly employed more than 28,000 
people. At this time, the market share held by co-operatives 
ranged from 30% in beef and lamb processing, through 
70% of grain purchasing and pig meat processing, to 97% 
of dairy processing. They are also very prominent in farm 
supplies and livestock marts (of which there were 34, having 
47,000 members and nearly 1,500 employees). 
However, a form of creeping demutualisation has led to 
their influence being diluted. To simplify a complex story, 
lax operation of co-operative principles led to a divergence 
of interest between co-op users and co-op members, and 
to problems in securing the capital needed to fund growth 
and technological change. In this situation, some large 
societies adopted the Co-operative plc model: they invited 
private investors to share ownership in a company running 
the co-operative’s business activity. The best known of 
these is Kerry Group plc, which has become a multinational 
company with production facilities in 23 countries and a €4.8 
billion annual turnover. McCarthy et al. comment: ‘While all 
of these cooperatives originally intended to retain a majority 
shareholding in the Plc, it has been worrying to note that the 
cooperatively owned shareholding is decreasing ... Kerry 
Cooperative now holds less than 40% control.’ Whether this 
trend will be arrested or will continue remains to be seen. 
Trade unions flourished in the post-war period, and the 
trend for them to become more involved in political activity 
beyond the workplace continued. At their height, they had 
over 12 million members and were key actors in corporatist 
economic governance and policy-making through their 
seats, alongside employers, on the National Economic 
Development Council (set up in 1961). However, during 
the 1960s and 1970s, trade unions were increasingly 
caught between the raised expectations of their activists 
and members and the realities of industrial decline and 
technological change. When the defence of sectional 
interests imposed increasing costs on the wider economy 
and society, the movement lost public sympathy and 
standing. Nevertheless, trade unions still have 6.9 million 
members, a density of 27% of people in employment (Barratt, 
2009) and they remain a taken-for-granted feature 
of industrial relations in many industries. 
Moreover, these established forms of economic activity 
under associational governance have continued to spread 
in areas where people still seek to engage with the modern 
economy on affordable terms. One notable success is 
the credit union movement in Ireland following its rebirth 
in 1960. By 1995, savings totalled IR£2 billion, half the 
population were members, and more than 3,000 people 
were employed. The UK renaissance started later and 
has followed different paths, often as part of regeneration 
strategies in disadvantaged areas, and most successfully 
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as an offshoot of established churches or neighbourhood 
groups. More than a million members now save with  
some 750 credit unions, employing over a thousand staff 
(ABCUL, 2002).
So are these classic forms still relevant? Can they really 
compete in the modern world – and be different? Clearly, 
the challenge for any business in a changing economy is 
to maintain an attractive offer in a way that sustains a loyal 
constituency. Previously successful private companies routinely 
fail this challenge; they decline and are eaten up by more 
vigorous newcomers. Hence, one reason for the relative 
decline of co-operatives and mutuals is simply that, with a few 
exceptions (for example, the Phone Co-op), ambitious business 
start-ups have not chosen this legal form. 
At the same time, social and industrial change has led to 
decline in areas of union and co-operative strength and to 
growth in other parts of the country or in new industries. 
Moreover, adapting to changed times presented specific 
challenges to these civil society associations: they had 
to renew their offer in a way that continued to combine 
economic and social value, and do this during what has 
been the era of the market and the corporation. This required 
them to uphold and reproduce distinctive values and beliefs, 
while still absorbing from their mainstream competitors 
any technological and business processes necessary for 
continuing viability in rapidly evolving markets.2 
So, to the constant demands of economic adjustment and 
renewal is added the need to reinvent membership, loyalty 
and engagement for changed times. Progressive critics within 
the building society and co-operative movements can point 
to the neglect of principles and membership development. 
Equally, the movement’s business leaders can point out that 
economic rationalisation was held back by an antiquated 
membership structure. Both are correct. Overall, civil society 
associations have done well enough to remain substantial 
players and some efforts are being made to search for new 
ways of renewing membership, loyalty and social purpose 
(for example, the explicitly ethical stance of the Co-operative 
Bank) under very different conditions from those in which the 
movements emerged and blossomed. 
The new forms of civil  
society activity
At the same time, late-modern or advanced industrial 
societies have generated many new challenges and currents 
of social concern. A great number of initiatives have arisen in 
response and many of these have grown into economically 
significant undertakings. Simplifying ruthlessly, Table 3 
summarises some of the main areas in which this has been 
happening. As before, it presents these developments in 
terms of the societal challenge, the civil society response, 
and the lasting systemic impact that seems to have resulted.
The major public services (health, education, housing, 
welfare, criminal justice) are economically very significant 
industries with further growth expected in health and social 
care especially. Civil society’s presence in these sectors 
has been steadily increasing through the development of 
‘mixed economies’ based on public service contracting, and 
the growth of the third sector, especially social enterprises. 
The reasons for this long-running trend essentially come 
down to three points: the aspirations and know-how of civil 
society activists, enabling them to envision better services; 
the better alignment of potentially divergent stakeholder 
concerns provided by third-sector organisations (and 
especially the greater scope for co-production3); and the 
fact that the policy cupboard is bare of any other credible 
strategies for making public service provision simultaneously 
more user-centred, cost-conscious and innovative. 
The rise of environmental concern and the green movement 
in its various manifestations has had pervasive economic 
effects. Campaigning for legislative changes is only a 
small part of the story: the development of marques (for 
sustainable forestry, marine stewardship, and so on) and 
of new green industries (renewable energy, wholefoods, 
organics, recycling, composting) has been intimately 
connected with specific civil society associations. The 
same combination of engagement in new forms of 
economic governance (through Fairtrade, SA8000, and 
other certification schemes; through NGO status in United 
Nations and World Trade Organization processes) and 
direct economic production (through transnational social 
enterprises) is evident in relation to poverty in the global 
south. What started in Oxfam shops and church halls 
30 years ago has come of age: the World Fair Trade 
Organization website (www.wfto.com) states that in 2008 
in the UK, about 20% of coffee consumed and 25% of 
bananas eaten were fairly traded. Growth appears to be 
continuing through the recession – and, more important, 
the range of products continues to expand. This is 
an international phenomenon of increasing scale and 
professionalism. 
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Finally, the open source movement – essentially, a reaction 
to the privatisation of knowledge – has been one of the 
great civil society successes of the last 20 years (Weber, 
2004). It also illustrates what is becoming more apparent 
and significant: the ways in which the new information 
and computing technologies (ICTs) can enable distributed 
collaboration, decision-making and governance. Increasingly, 
similar processes are being deployed in relation to other 
technologies (Jefferson, 2006).
Overall, it is clear that civil society associations engage as 
actively as ever with the economy by pursuing new forms 
of politics (through activism, engagement in governance 
processes and the creation of certification systems) and by 
developing new types of business tied into the values of 
specific constituencies and social movements. Of course, 
one can always take one specific initiative on its own (for 
example, Fairtrade coffee) and question its tangible benefits 
and impact. Indeed, the activists involved will often argue 
and agonise about this as much as anyone (they know 
the immediate benefits of Fairtrade will not Make Poverty 
History). But such arguments miss the bigger picture: the 
fact that ethical consumption has entered the mainstream 
economy. The major retailers dare not ignore this shift in 
customer values, and by embracing it they also reinforce 
it. Tesco’s website recently boasted that a third of Fairtrade 
sales in the UK are made through its supermarkets. This 
means that all those Fairtrade messages are scattered 
through their stores up and down the land, implicitly 
questioning the acceptability of so many other products, 
along with the business processes and trade regimes that 
deliver them. No political party could afford advertising on 
that scale, yet it is continuing indefinitely. 
More broadly, big changes do not start with legislation – 
that happens towards the end of the process. Whether it 
is slavery or children being sent up chimneys, the change 
starts when these practices become controversial. The 
loss of social acceptability is the turning point. Of course, 
the vested interests fight rearguard actions but the more 
thoughtful in the business community, and those setting out 
on their careers, know better. Who wants to spend their life 
working for a discredited company in a dirty industry? All 
economic activity is embedded in a normative environment 
that constrains and shapes it. Civil society activity in its 
manifold expressions is the vanguard of that normative 
environment. 
Table 3: Civil society activity and the economy in late-modern times
Societal problem Civil society responses and 
organisational forms
Institutional legacy
Limits and failings of welfare 
capitalism
Counter-culture, community action, feminism and 
single-issue politics.
Expanded third sector; more dynamic quasi-
markets for public services; new modes of 
co-production in social markets.
Environmental degradation and 
climate change
Environmental movement in myriad forms; from 
global campaigning bodies and green businesses 
to the organic movement and community 
composting.
Carbon trading and other innovations in 
regulation; technological innovation; market 
differentiation; new market creation and 
‘defensive following’ by established companies.
Poverty in the global south Trade justice, anti-globalisation and movement of 
movements; campaigning, pursuing alternatives 
through NGOs.
Incremental advances in global governance 
through non-statutory regulation (for example, 
Fairtrade); shifts in public values.
Antisocial technological 
monopolies
Open source movement: software developers 
and other professional experts engaging in 
collaborative problem-solving.
Creative Commons licence and new structures in 
software and biotechnology industries.
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For those well disposed to such activity, questions 
about why and how to promote the roles of civil society 
associations in growing a civil economy often seem 
simple. It’s just a matter of dismantling the barriers to 
social enterprise, including those arrangements that 
implicitly favour the private sector. In reality, things quickly 
become more complicated. 
For example, are the difficulties of accessing capital a 
barrier restricting the proper development of the civil 
economy that needs to be addressed? Or are they 
instead a weakness inherent in the legal forms used to 
constitute social enterprises, a weakness that can only be 
overcome by government assistance? On the latter view, 
calls to remove barriers may look suspiciously like appeals 
for sectoral favouritism. There may well be a case for this,  
but any such state aid will always be open to some  
obvious challenges (‘If they’re so good why do they need 
additional support?’); they are likely to involve some 
familiar pitfalls (governments can stifle organisations even 
as they try to assist them); and they rarely help in setting 
priorities for the use of scarce resources (which of the 
myriad civil society initiatives offering diverse benefits are 
most worthy of support?). 
Besides, one can be generally well disposed to civil 
society projects without imagining that they will always 
succeed in the short or long term. Idealising civil society 
organisations is no more warranted than idealising private 
companies or public agencies – as the research has 
shown: ‘Various studies have compared the performance 
of private, public and nonprofit providers in fields where 
they all operate – such as health care (hospitals), nursery 
provision, schools and residential care for the elderly. 
These have often involved research designs in order to 
take account of hard-to-measure dimensions of quality, 
and to allow for differences in client intake. The overall 
pattern of the results is clear: the differences within a 
sector are much greater than the differences between 
sectors. That is to say, although a particular sector may 
come out on top in a particular comparison, all three 
sectors always provide a wide range of performance 
from the very well run to the badly run – with most 
organizations neither the one nor the other.’ (Paton, 2003 pp. 
8-9 and note 1 on p. 168 for key references).
It is possible, of course, that this finding will be refined or 
superseded by further research. Perhaps it will be shown 
that, in some fields, when a wider range of social benefits 
is taken into account, civil society associations do usually 
use resources more effectively. But this possibility only 
confirms the central point – that generalised claims of 
sectoral virtue are not enough. More specific evidence is 
needed of where and how civil society associations can 
be expected to provide additional benefits. The difficulty 
for policy-makers has been that arguments have either 
been very general (for instance, claims about the inherent 
benefits of co-operation, about building social capital 
or strengthening the normative environment), or ultra-
specific, not to say anecdotal (for example, pointing to 
particular successes whose sustainability and replicability 
can always be questioned).
This section tries to address this issue by suggesting what 
sorts of benefits have been provided and may reasonably 
be expected in different fields or situations. First, however, 
some international examples and comparisons are 
introduced. As well as illustrating different types of benefit, 
these demonstrate what has been possible elsewhere and 
offer some pointers for how civil society associations and 
government can interact productively. 
Some international comparisons  
and experience
(i) UK and European health  
insurance systems 
In the debates during the second world war about 
the future of national insurance, Beveridge (1942, p. 32) 
proposed that the friendly societies should continue to 
have a role in a new welfare state, while private-sector 
industrial life offices should not. He argued that industrial 
life offices might have ‘a direct economic motive to be 
liberal with the money of the Social Insurance Fund, 
in order to obtain or retain customers for industrial 
assurance and to increase the profits of their shareholders 
or the pay of their staff’. His doubts reflected long-
standing problems over their mis-selling of burial policies 
and he argued that friendly societies which also sold 
additional products to top up state provision would be 
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more reliable agents for the government. This alignment 
of incentives was complemented by better administration, 
since the friendly societies had a good local system for 
checking sickness claims, while the industrial life offices 
did not – one of the reasons the latter preferred more 
straightforward life business such as burial policies (Mabbet, 
2001). Beveridge also valued friendly societies for their 
sympathetic treatment of their members. Nevertheless, the 
1944 White Paper on Social Insurance, and subsequently 
Parliament, took a different view, opting instead for a 
centralised state system of social insurance.4 The friendly 
societies declined rapidly thereafter. 
In contrast to the UK, France and Germany both have 
‘corporatist conservative welfare systems’ (Esping-
Andersen, 1990), which have maintained more pluralist 
arrangements for financing the welfare system, retaining 
substantial roles for mutuals in social insurance 
systems. The French system, for example, is based on 
contribution funding, which places the emphasis on 
workers and their families, and it is managed by social 
partners (representing employers and employees). Like 
health systems everywhere, this one faces challenges, 
and its independence from the state has been eroded 
by gradual increases in regulation, along with higher 
levels of state subsidies (Palier, 1997). Nevertheless, with 
hindsight, Parliament might well have done better to follow 
Beveridge’s advice in 1944. 
(ii) The International Dispensary  
Association (IDA) and the market for 
essential medicines in Africa
Markets for medicines in low-income countries are 
potentially lucrative and dangerously under-regulated (the 
supply chains, from manufacture to use, are marked by 
strong incentives to cheat and mislead). Counterfeit and 
poor-quality medicines are widespread, leading not just to 
unnecessary suffering and death, but to disease resistance 
and the discrediting of scientific treatments. An economic 
study of these markets discovered that, in Africa, the 
International Dispensary Association (IDA), an NGO based 
in Amsterdam, had played a crucial role since the early 
1970s. It had become a major wholesale supplier to 
African governments and health-care systems by focusing 
on the supply of essential medicines only, and by working 
hard to ensure quality as well as low prices. Its role as 
a benchmark and ‘beneficial competitor’ in the industry 
became apparent from interviews with its competitors: 
‘In every interview with competitors, buyers and with 
most international organizations, [the IDA] was mentioned 
unprompted, and aspects of firm strategy were explained 
with reference to the IDA.’ (Mackintosh, 2008, p. 12). 
It was, for example, described by an executive in a for-
profit firm as ‘the most aggressive player in the business’.
This market is currently undergoing major changes 
(manufacture has shifted to the Indian subcontinent; 
purchasing has become highly concentrated, either cutting 
out wholesalers altogether or changing their role), and 
these mean that IDA’s influence may now wane. But the 
opportunities for other social enterprises based in Africa 
and India to set standards in their markets for essential 
medicines are opening up at the same time.
(iii) Wind power in Denmark and  
the USA5  
Wind energy is now a rapidly growing industry, but it is 
not a new idea. For example, in Holland and Denmark 
it has a long tradition dating from medieval times. After 
the 1973 oil crisis, the ecological movement supported 
a new generation of wind power initiatives in the face of 
competition from nuclear and conventional sources of 
energy. Networks of community-based turbine owners 
and enthusiasts supported product development by 
manufacturers (mechanical and agricultural engineering 
firms). The movement’s magazine, Naturlig Energi 
circulated information and technical assessments of 
different products and helped create a wider climate 
of support. This influenced the Renewable Energy 
Committee of the Danish Parliament, which helped shape 
policy towards wind power and pressured utilities to 
accommodate it. 
As the technology has evolved, larger turbines have 
become the norm, and this has influenced some change in 
their ownership. In the early days, individuals erected them 
on their own land, then guilds (co-operative partnerships) 
became predominant in the key growth period after the oil 
crisis. Later on, utilities invested in the market, but since 
the mid-1990s, individuals (farmers) have again dominated 
ownership. The Danish government shaped developments 
by pressuring utilities to allow connections, by subsidising 
connections, by subsidising the erection of turbines and 
by supporting the Riso test station for turbines (crucial for 
incrementally improving designs by working closely with 
both users and manufacturers). In the early 1980s, the 
Danes began exporting to California where the subsidies 
were greater than at home. They had won 65% of the 
market in 1986, when tax breaks ended and the market 
crashed. However, the international market broadened 
and Danish manufacturers recovered to gain a leading role 
there instead. 
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Despite similar early experience of wind machines in 
agriculture, the wind power industry in the USA took a 
very different path, with aerospace companies aiming 
to develop wind turbines for utility companies. This was 
more technology push than the market pull of Danish 
wind power. The aerospace experience and the support 
of NASA gave advantages, but the need for maintenance-
free reliability was underestimated. Although the Americans 
had their own wind power association, they did not have 
evolutionary cycles of development in close association 
with users. Thirteen companies received grants from the 
state-funded Rocky Flats testing station (less user-oriented 
than its Danish equivalent), but only one of them competed 
well in the California market. But when the subsidies 
were cut and the home market declined, all bar one 
failed; product maintenance problems had rendered them 
uncompetitive in export markets.
This experience conforms to what has been found 
elsewhere in the study of innovation systems: user-driven 
‘cluster dynamics’ sustain an evolutionary pattern of use, 
feedback and development.6 In this case, the formation of 
a trade association amongst Danish manufacturers and 
the wind guild ownership model, based on the Danish co-
operative tradition, contributed to a grassroots movement 
of users and enthusiasts who, in turn, helped drive the 
technological development and supported calls for specific 
state assistance or regulatory reform. 
(iv) UK Parent Playgroups and Swedish 
social co-ops
The Pre-school Playgroup Association (PPA) was formed 
in 1961 as a self-help movement based on the values of 
user (parent) development through involvement, and child 
development through play. With very little state subsidy, it 
grew from about 150 member groups in 1962, to about 
18,500 pre-school groups and about 600,000 places 
in 1992 (Abraham and Macfarlane, 1992). After a structural 
review in 1991, it centralised its grassroots network 
structure and changed its name to Pre-school Learning 
Alliance (PLA) in 1995. It was at this time still the main 
form of provision. However, in April 1995 the Conservative 
government introduced a voucher system for part-time 
education of four-year-olds. With a change of government, 
policy shifted to a more comprehensive National Childcare 
Strategy covering a range of types of provision, governed 
through local partnerships. By 2000, the strategy had 
been extended to three-year-olds. Despite this substantial 
increase in funding and several vigorous campaigns by 
the PLA to raise their own profile, parent playgroups were 
not the main beneficiaries. According to Penn and Randall 
(2005), a net loss of 54,000 playgroup places occurred 
in 1997–2001. Institutionally, the main beneficiaries were 
primary schools, although private nursery chains also 
prospered (and floated on the stock exchange). This 
happened largely because the government’s childcare 
policy focused tightly on supporting welfare to work, 
addressing child poverty and raising the educational quality 
of childcare. The day-care needs of working families and 
other broader considerations (including gender equity, 
enhanced citizenship,7 community-building, etc.) were 
sidelined. The implementation process also played a role, 
since provision had to be governed through a partnership 
led by local authorities and contracted through LEAs. This 
had predictable consequences, marginalising the volunteer 
organisers and favouring more established partners – 
because working closely with the latter made the planning 
and allocation process easier for LEA staff. In these ways, 
policy changes to extend childcare provision resulted in a 
decline in provision through parent playgroup associations. 
During roughly the same period, a more sympathetic 
Swedish state allowed a mixed economy of nursery care 
to develop with a substantial contribution from the social 
economy (almost 25% in 1998). The Swedish welfare 
system began to change in the mid-1980s, partly as a 
result of rising demand over a number of years. New 
legislation led to the development of a mixed economy 
of provision; it allowed other providers such as parent 
childcare co-operatives to be formed and to access public 
funds, and later, private providers were allowed to enter 
the market, resulting in a mixed economy of provision. Fee 
levels rose and subsequent government policy demanded 
that municipalities make childcare universally available, and 
in 1994, that parents’ fee levels be capped. The mix of 
policy measures – liberalising but also regulating – has led 
to differences in provision between localities. By 1998, in 
Stockholm, the local municipalities still dominated provision 
with 75% of all childcare provision at day centres, 1.25% 
by for-profit enterprises, 10% by voluntary organisations, 
and 13.75% by co-operatives (8.75% by parent co-
operatives and 5% by employee co-ops). Nationally, 
the co-ops provide between 12% and 15% of childcare 
provision. But despite the variation, researchers Pestoff 
and Strandbrink (2004, p. 75) found some general trends: ‘It 
is thus clear that parent co-ops provide the socially most 
ambitious form of childcare. Here, both service quality 
and parental and social involvement standards appear to 
be substantially higher than elsewhere. But the municipal 
sector also seems to perform reasonably (indeed often 
very) well, although it partly caters to different socio-
economic segments of the population. The relative low 
performer by comparison is corporate for-profit childcare.’
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Civil society associations, public policy 
and industry dynamics
Most justifications for civil society activity in the economy 
point to their direct impacts – the benefits to particular 
stakeholders. From an economists’ perspective, they take 
the firm as the level and unit of analysis and offer a static 
account of the potential or actual advantages (in terms of 
distributional benefits). The preceding examples suggest 
an alternative approach: to think in terms of industries, 
and to consider the different ways in which civil society 
associations may contribute to and influence the industries 
in which they work. Viewed in these terms, their roles and 
contributions seem to take the following forms.
Domination – in some periods, particular industries or 
market segments have simply been dominated by civil 
society associations. In their heyday, the building society 
movement, agricultural co-operatives in Ireland, and print 
unions in the newspaper industry are all cases in point. 
However, civil society associations, like other organisations, 
can easily become victims of their own success, and 
in evolving markets sustained domination is unusual: 
it stimulates innovative competitors and the growth of 
countervailing power. 
Moderation – sometimes the presence of one or more 
civil society associations in a mixed or largely for-profit 
marketplace constrains the behaviour of other firms. The 
International Dispensary Association is a particularly clear 
example of this. Childcare co-operatives in Sweden may 
well have a similar effect. Likewise, the leading building 
societies provided beneficial competition in the mortgage 
and retail banking markets for much of the post-war 
period. The continuing presence of mutuals in the life-
insurance industry is another, and interesting, case in point. 
The prevailing view among economic historians is that 
by making policy-holders into owners, the mutual form 
reduces conflicts of interest and prevents shareholders 
from taking advantage of their customers – a risk which 
is very real given the duration and uncertainties that 
characterise life insurance. On the other hand, as well as 
the usual difficulties of acquiring start-up or expansion 
capital, the governance processes of mutual societies 
appear to exert less pressure for cost-containment and 
investment performance than their private-sector rivals.  
As a result, private insurers will often outperform mutuals, 
- but only so long as they can restrain themselves from 
extracting ever more value from their highly vulnerable 
customers.8 Hence, each form has the weakness of its 
strengths, but together they go some way to ensuring both 
competitive pressure and the upholding of the interests of 
policy-holders within the industry. 
Regulation – in farming, environmental and labour 
standards, and trading practices, certification schemes 
have become an established form of non-statutory 
regulation. Civil society associations have played leading 
roles both in creating most of these schemes and in 
monitoring conformance. Such initiatives can be usefully 
understood as instances of institutional entrepreneurship: 
they create new institutions – standards, measurement 
practices, ratings agencies – that then affect the behaviour 
of an entire field. Such leverage is obviously attractive, but 
it is also hard-won. Existing firms and agencies in a field 
will not be inattentive to developments that may affect 
them. Where civil society associations succeed, it seems 
to be because they have established themselves in a key 
position, both widely respected and in communication 
with diverse stakeholders. They can then use this status 
to develop and promote both operationally feasible 
routines and practices, and a clear, credible ‘story’ about 
the necessity and value of the new arrangements.9 Such 
developments extend the already substantial regulatory 
role of civil society associations to other areas. In particular, 
an extensive body of work has shown that the problems 
of preserving ‘commons’ (such as grazing lands, forests, 
groundwater basins and fisheries) are better handled 
under associational governance than under either statutory 
regulation or a regime of private property rights.10 
Innovation – at times, civil society associations have 
effectively invented new technologies and business 
models which have then been taken up in adapted forms 
by the private or public sectors. The low-cost, portable, 
high-performance water pumps developed by Kickstart 
for African farmers, but with supply and maintenance 
provided by private businesses, is a recent case of 
technological innovation.11 In terms of business models, 
modern microfinance was invented by Grameen Bank, but 
it has long since ceased to be the preserve of civil society 
associations. Private banks stimulate and support lending 
clubs as a way to increase the market for commercial 
banking services.12 On other occasions, as with wind 
power in Denmark, civil society associations play a vital 
enabling role. Such market, or user-driven innovation 
(through evolutionary cluster dynamics), has been 
noted in various industries. Examples include software 
development, extreme sports equipment manufacturers 
developing close ties with youthful enthusiasts, and drug 
development for low-income populations of sufferers by 
the Institute for One World Health (Benkler, 2006). 
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Incorporation – where civil society associations have 
come to lead or dominate in a field whose importance is 
then deemed to warrant either universal provision or major 
public funding, the result is generally the mixed blessing 
of incorporation, as the health systems of France and 
Germany illustrate. In the UK, the ambiguous status of 
housing associations – formally independent but intensely 
regulated – are the clearest example (and one where 
the contrast with, for example, Dutch arrangements is 
instructive). When governments work through civil society 
associations in this way, it is because they want to ensure 
some pluralism in provision as well as the advantages of 
arm’s-length oversight. How best to handle the tensions 
that inevitably come with incorporation is an area meriting 
further research, preferably involving comparative studies. 
Another variant of incorporation is using the form of an 
independent mutual or not-for-profit legal entity to provide 
monopoly infrastructure or utility services (as in the cases 
of Welsh Water and Network Rail). Again, this avoids 
either integration into the state (with all the problems of 
drawn out decision-making and ministerial interference) or 
privatisation (with all the usual incentive misalignment and 
regulatory challenges).
Alleviation – the role of some civil society associations is 
to prevent or mitigate some form of economic exclusion. 
As noted, many credit unions in the UK have been set up 
as part of poverty reduction of regeneration strategies. 
Other civil society associations are formed to take over 
and run socially significant businesses that are insufficiently 
profitable to continue in operation under private ownership. 
Many community businesses (for instance, village shops 
and pubs) and worker co-operatives have been formed 
in these circumstances. Whether or not they achieve a 
turnaround and succeed in the longer term under social 
ownership, a measure of public support for these ventures 
can often be justified in hard economic terms, quite apart 
from their social benefits (Paton, 1989). 
The international examples and comparisons illustrate other 
important points. What works depends on the context 
– as shaped by the way institutions have evolved and 
communicated in the currently dominant political discourse. 
This is most obvious when countries are compared. For 
example, the Mondragon co-operatives and the Italian 
social co-operatives, shining examples of innovation in co-
operative development, emerged in Spain and Italy, where 
co-operative forms have a long and still-living tradition. By 
contrast, in other countries like Belgium the non-profit form 
(association sans but lucratif) is more often chosen. 
And in the UK, with its stronger transatlantic policy 
networks and influential Third Way commentators (such as 
Giddens, 1998), social enterprise has been the preferred 
form. Context matters locally, as well. Amin (2002) showed, 
in his study of four cities, that Middlesbrough’s corporatist 
alliance between an ‘Old Labour’ council and one large 
paternalist employer left little space for the social economy. 
Such differences do not mean that policy transfer and 
civil society association replication, scale-up and roll-out 
are bound to fail. It does mean that policies and practices 
copied from elsewhere may have to be developed flexibly 
and gradually, and in step with local institutions. The point 
is that the development of civil society initiatives in a given 
field is path-dependent: when they succeed, the growth 
process is interactive and cumulative, with the civil society 
associations gradually being able to modify or shape 
the institutional environment as their economic standing, 
technical expertise, social and political alliances and 
popular legitimacy all accumulate. 
To put the point another way, part of the process of 
institutionalising a social innovation is ensuring that it is 
embedded in its social and political environment. This 
requires engagement with the governance of the field 
or industry in question. Thus, for example, when the 
Italian social co-ops developed in the early 1980s, the 
early initiatives were carried out by pioneering social 
entrepreneurs using existing legal structures and it 
was only as the movement grew that it negotiated a 
complementary institutional framework, comprising both 
a more appropriate legal form and recognised federations 
(consorzi) that support individual social co-ops. Likewise, 
the EMES analysis of 160 work integration social 
enterprises in 11 European countries noted that, usually, 
pioneering initiatives have been followed by new legislation 
giving recognition to the innovative arrangements, and new 
public policies and programmes specially designed for 
them (Nyssens, 2006). 
Of course, how much can be achieved varies according 
to the standing of the social economy. For example, some 
governments have introduced voucher systems for the 
purchase of homecare services; this has created jobs and 
formalised the informal economy (thereby reducing benefit 
fraud and increasing the tax gathered). In Belgium, this 
policy led to private businesses rather than social economy 
organisations gaining the highest market share (58% 
versus 25%). By contrast, in Quebec with a much stronger 
social economy, the voucher scheme for homecare 
services recognised the added value of the social 
economy and the tendency for the private sector to focus 
on the easier or more profitable segments of the market 
(‘creaming’). Consequently, their voucher market was 
designed to favour organisations in the social economy. 
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In summary, this chapter has proposed that the 
contribution of civil society associations in growing a 
civil economy may best be understood by focusing on 
the different industries or fields in which civil society 
associations are active. Likewise, when they have 
succeeded, it is often at the industry level that a gradual 
reconstruction of regulations, commissioning policies and 
funding regimes has enabled them to consolidate and 
expand – thereby introducing new practices, setting new 
standards, integrating divergent interests and improving 
the functioning of markets. It appears that by influencing 
the evolution of an industry, civil society associations can, 
and quite often do, generate diffuse and long-lasting social 
benefits. Of course, this is not to claim that they all produce 
such effects; but they can bring them about in a variety of 
different ways, some of which, because they are indirect, 
can be easily overlooked. 
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Previous chapters have reviewed the evolving economic 
contribution of civil society and explored some of the ways 
in which it has come to be influential at different times and 
in different places. This chapter looks ahead and considers 
how civil society associations might have more economic 
presence and influence. It addresses two questions:
What is already happening that may grow into increased 
economic influence? This means reviewing positive trends, 
initiatives and opportunities for civil society.
What else has to happen for these civil society initiatives 
and trends to gather strength? The aim is to highlight 
factors likely to condition whether, how far and how fast 
such positive developments continue to unfold.
As well as building on previous chapters, the discussion 
draws on ideas that emerged in the course of a workshop 
the Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society hosted, at which 
participants were invited to imagine that ‘the 800lb gorilla 
of global capitalism’ had been ‘house-trained’ by civil 
society. The question was: how might this (most plausibly) 
have come about? They were encouraged to focus on 
the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, but were left 
to decide for themselves what this phrase referred to 
nowadays. Participants were asked to sketch out narrative 
fragments, as if they were passages from some future 
history written about 2030. This material was gathered, 
grouped under headings, in some cases developed further, 
and then circulated for comment and further ideas. In doing 
this, nothing was included for which there was not some 
precedent or an evidenced trend; but of course, it is not 
in any sense a prediction. The result – given in Appendix 
2 – is a version of a scenario developed as a stimulus for 
discussion and reflection. 
Table 4 (see pp. 20-21) lists some of the societal challenges 
that have definite economic dimensions and that were 
identified through the workshop. It gives examples of the 
civil society initiatives that are attempting to address them. 
It sketches out the grounds for thinking that such initiatives 
may have the potential to gather strength and the sorts of 
impact that might be achieved. But can civil society activity 
grow this much additional muscle across so much of the 
body economic? To be sure, the increasing severity and 
urgency of some of these challenges is a motivator. But 
a more civil economy requires that numerous new social 
movements find expression and take root – and this can 
only mean a lot of organising.13 If this much organisational 
capability has not been available before in civil society, why 
might it develop now?
This is surely a central issue – and three long-standing 
trends suggest a possible answer: 
The development of ICTs and the web have reduced the 
transaction costs of organising and campaigning. Initiatives 
like Avaaz and Simpol,14 quite apart from the spontaneous 
use of social networking sites to share information and 
mobilise public support, represent new ways of connecting 
civil society initiatives behind focused campaigns. Virtual 
team-working by dedicated volunteers, often on a very 
large scale, is now commonplace. 
The phenomenon of the third age is creating a huge pool 
of capable and experienced people outside of full-time 
employment. Often, they possess technical knowledge 
and expertise relevant to specific issues or they have 
general organisational skills. Wider experience and maturity 
can be particularly valuable in governance processes. 
E-volunteering is often flexible in the hours required and 
so can be combined more easily with other commitments. 
Clearly, too, the predilection of large organisations, both 
public and private, for high-intensity work patterns and 
for youth rather than experience, adds to the availability 
of mature talent. A deepening recession and rising 
unemployment would also increase availability. 
Modernist politics – of mass movements and parties – 
has given way to more direct forms of social and political 
activism, what used to be called single-issue politics. 
New and creative initiatives continue to proliferate: 
some are campaigning or watchdog bodies, others 
aim to be financially self-sustaining. This upsurge of 
dispersed leadership – often, but not always, discussed 
in terms of social entrepreneurship – is increasingly 
supported by a networked infrastructure of funders, 
social investors, support services and incubators. It 
may be patchy, but this broad pattern is visible from 
distressed estates (where micro-grants enable ‘can do’ 
residents to pursue neighbourhood projects) through to 
national and transnational schemes to encourage social 
entrepreneurship such as those of Schwab and Ashoka.15 
4Part 4: Prospects: Possibilities and preconditions for a civil economy
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Table 4: Areas for economic action and intervention
Societal challenge:
Issues concerning broad 
groupings 
Indicative developments:
Emergent civil society 
responses 
Socio-economic logic and potential impacts:
Why and how civil society associations may 
achieve influence
1. Economic power of retail brands
Food quality: GMOs, food miles, 
pesticides, farming practices, salt/
fat levels etc. 
‘Transition towns’ movement, food 
clubs and co-ops, organic direct 
schemes, farmers’ markets, slow food 
movement, numerous food-based 
social enterprises, ‘grow-your-own’ 
and resurgence of allotment societies.
Blurring of consumption and production; communities of 
enthusiasts offer added social value; emergence of alternative 
supply networks sustaining new markets; ‘beneficial competition’ 
prompts corporate responses and emboldens regulators.
Rampant consumerism: 
exploitative sourcing, throwaway 
products, environmental 
degradation, cultural warping, 
‘clone town’ Britain etc.
‘Living wage’ campaign and new 
certification schemes; possible 
integrative super-marque as a strong 
brand of ethical consumption; counter-
cultural activism – subvertisements, 
‘no shopping’ days, etc.
Value alignment for ‘ethical consumers’; civil society association 
marques are more trustworthy and simplify purchase decisions; 
gradual spread of simplicity lifestyles and ‘post-consumerism’.
2. Dysfunctions of the financial system
Financial exclusion of the  
‘un-creditworthy’.
Expansion of credit unions; peer-to-
peer lending through Zopa, Kiva, etc.
Social capital overcomes market failure/low trust dynamics.
Disgust with/loss of confidence in 
commercial banking; conventional 
banks fail to understand social 
ventures or to lend reasonably.
Emergence of standards for ethical 
finance as in Islamic Finance: 
development of institutions (non-profit 
rating agencies) and instruments 
(social impact bonds) of social finance.
Higher standards reduce transaction costs of lending and loan 
supervision: pension funds introduce ethical criteria; foundations 
use mission-related criteria in managing funds.
Instabilities created by  
short-termism affecting  
global capital flows.
Watchdogs and campaigning groups 
re-corporate taxation, financial 
regulation, etc.
Transnational civil society networks combine expertise and 
legitimacy, and mobilise large numbers.
3. Carbon reduction and climate change
Challenge of developing  
low-carbon lifestyles.
Transition towns, cycling clubs and 
lobbies; green-build initiatives.
Enthusiastic user-base provides feedback in development of new 
designs.
Renewable energy generation, 
energy efficiency.
Community-based windpower, solar 
and CHP; green energy companies 
offer feed-in tariff.
User-ownership avoids conflicts of interest; technology 
development and market creation.
Continued
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Societal challenge:
Issues concerning broad 
groupings 
Indicative developments:
Emergent civil society 
responses 
Socio-economic logic and potential impacts:
Why and how civil society associations may 
achieve influence
4. Health, well-being and social care
Health care: impossibility of 
financing and providing the best 
care for everyone. Obesity and 
other diseases of affluence.
Expert patients; self-help groups 
around medical conditions; ‘listeners’ 
helping prevent suicide in prisons. 
Sports, dance, walking and other clubs 
and societies.
Co-production based on an asset-based philosophy – seeing  
people as the solution, not the problem. 
Mutual aid/gift economy – provides alternative system of social 
status and involvement.
Social care: rising levels of demand 
face cost and quality ceilings.
New forms of user involvement and 
control; service user co-ops for  
elderly people.
Co-production based on an asset-based philosophy: seeing  
people as the solution, not the problem.
5. Media, information and learning
Shallow and selective journalism; 
distrust of government and 
corporate ‘spin’ and control of 
information. Desire for, or to share, 
knowledge and understanding. 
Independent film-making and  
edu-tainment; fact checker websites; 
citizen journalists; anti-awards; rival 
media and events (social action film 
festival etc.); peer review processes; 
whistle-blower websites.
ICTs reduce costs of production and distribution, beyond  
corporate/government control; public service opportunity/mutual 
aid; chance to exercise creativity and talent, develop new skills; 
rewards of community membership/belonging.
Need for more, better, cheaper, 
closer and more timely learning 
opportunities in a knowledge 
economy. Obsolescence of 
knowledge.
Peer-to-peer learning; web-based 
communities of practice and interest; 
web-facilitated LETS schemes; 
Wikipedia and its derivatives.
Public service opportunity; chance to exercise creativity and  
talent, develop new skills; additional rewards of community 
membership/belonging.
6. The arms industry and organised violence
Arms races in unstable regions; 
small-arms trade in the global 
south; guns and gangs in cities.
Watchdogs and campaigns  
concerned with the arms trade, 
specific weapons, corrupt arms 
manufacturers and dealers; conflict 
prevention and conciliation.
Combination of expertise, legitimacy and public support; ability 
often to operate ‘below the radar’.
7. Broader economic governance: upholding the ground rules for a sustainable economy; challenging  
vested interests of rich and powerful
Income and wealth distribution. Watchdogs and campaigns around 
incomes distribution/policy.
Combination of expertise, legitimacy and public support.
Income security in old age. Pensions campaigns. Growing constituency mobilised through civil society  
associations, societies, service provision, self-help groups.
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Needless to say, these three trends can, and often do, 
enable and reinforce each other. However, if they are to 
assist in developing the necessary muscle, some other 
conditions are also likely to be important. To succeed, 
many of the civil society initiatives indicated in Table 4 
will require the development of extensive horizontal links 
sometimes among highly disparate grassroots groupings. 
This kind of organising is particularly challenging – for the 
very reasons that it is so important. It requires participants 
to go beyond their local identities and perspectives and 
make common cause with ‘others’ they may have feared 
or disparaged. Nevertheless, it can succeed, as the 
Alinsky-ist alliances of community organisations in London 
and elsewhere (often including inter-faith networks), which 
now have some notable achievements to their credit, have 
shown. Or some of the international campaigning networks 
and alliances that gave rise to the idea of a movement 
of movements; for example, the World Social Forum or, 
more specifically, northern NGOs and indigenous peoples’ 
organisations combining to block World Bank funding of 
environmentally damaging projects. At a more mundane 
level, learning to work together in consortia to win and 
share larger contracts may be the way forward for some 
smaller civil society associations. Indeed, a consistent 
and crucial lesson that emerges from reviewing the 
experience of successful co-operative movements around 
the world has been the importance of building up their 
own infrastructure of financial, training, advisory and other 
services (see, for example, Cornforth et al. (1988).
Likewise, vertical links will be important for many of the 
initiatives, whether to access funds, specific expertise, 
political influence or visibility in the media. The best 
results from what has been gushingly termed philanthro-
capitalism (Bishop and Green, 2007) have been achieved 
through such vertical coalitions. Media personalities, 
faith bodies, academia and progressive foundations 
have all been important in bringing together coalitions of 
the apparently powerful and the apparently powerless. 
Indeed, it is increasingly clear that a key role for civil 
society associations in an era of globalisation and wicked 
problems is as the convener or broker of complex, multi-
party initiatives involving both national and international 
public bodies as well as multinational companies and 
campaigning NGOs: the Global Aids Vaccine Initiative 
is an example. More mundanely, another version of the 
contracting coalition could be formed by large, strong 
civil society associations acting as lead contractor and 
intermediary for smaller local ones.
Engagement with government and other public bodies is 
also going to be crucial. As was argued in the preceding 
chapter, the strengthening of the civil economy will require 
a continuing series of small adjustments to regulatory 
regimes (and occasionally larger ones) to remove blocks 
and encourage pro-social behaviour in particular fields or 
industries. 
Currently, the agenda for such discussions includes:
•	 reducing barriers to volunteering and the recognition  
of professional volunteers in procurement contracts;
•	 reforming the welfare system to align better with  
the contribution of work integration civil society  
associations (and prevent perverse incentives 
associated with benefit loss);
•	 asset transfer policies to put community anchor 
organisations on a secure footing;
•	 clarification by the Charity Commission that the concept 
of fiduciary duty does not preclude the use of ethical 
and social criteria in investment policies;
•	 taking steps to educate public officials about the nature, 
functioning and contribution of civil society associations 
– in everything from the Small Business Service to 
service procurement in health and local government.
This list is far from complete, but it is enough to illustrate 
the often technical level at which many of the important 
discussions (and struggles) must take place. This is not 
to suggest that politics on behalf of civil society – or more 
accurately, particular civil society groupings – is now only 
a matter of managerial fixing. Some larger campaigns 
may well be required to promote more controversial 
changes. For example, it has been suggested that a 
national home-working initiative would reduce unnecessary 
commuting and promote better work–life balance, and 
would also assist local civil society. A different sort of 
continuing campaign may be required in order to end the 
political class’s constantly disappointed love-affair with 
large corporate hierarchies, whether private or public.16 
Of course, these are hard to avoid in some parts of public 
service (such as HMRC), but the emphasis on large-scale 
contracting in various social markets is demonstrably 
at odds with the very reasons why governments have 
sought to involve third-sector organisations in the first 
place (responsiveness to local circumstances, greater 
stakeholder engagement, co-production, etc.). 
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Overall, it is important to recognise that an increased 
role for civil society associations requires both decisive 
government intervention and some restraint and retreat by 
government. Government must remain strong because its 
role in redistribution is more, rather than less, important 
in open economies, especially in times of recession. Less 
obviously, it must also be strong because the creation of 
a civil economy will depend on a procedural state to set 
and uphold the rules of many pluralistic and constantly 
contested games. Just as the neo-liberal market required 
a strong, market-making state, so a mixed economy with 
a much enhanced civil sector will require a robust referee, 
one not enthralled by the rich and powerful, and with, so to 
speak, the ground staff to constantly recreate level playing 
fields.17 
At the same time, however, the state must also retreat 
if civil society associations are to have the space to 
innovate and avoid creeping and dysfunctional forms of 
incorporation. This will involve recognising the gratifications 
and dynamics of power, and how deeply institutionalised 
some assumptions about the role of ministers and senior 
officials are. As long as ‘everyone knows’ these people 
have to remain in charge of all that happens and therefore 
need to be kept informed through extensive monitoring, 
then more fluid, responsive and creative forms of 
networked governance will only be possible unofficially, in 
precarious and circumscribed ways. Spasms of ministerial 
decisiveness in response to tabloid furores are no way to 
orchestrate the governance of complex industries.
The considerable challenge for politicians will be to 
combine the needed procedural strength with the 
substantive restraint and retreat. The reciprocal challenge 
for civil society leaders and activists will be to do as much 
as they possibly can for themselves, but then also to 
work constructively and frankly with governments when 
they have to, without becoming dependent on them in 
inappropriate ways.
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5Part 5: Conclusions: Starting from where we are
‘ I am done with great things and big things, great organisations and big successes. And I am for those tiny invisible molecular 
moral forces which work from individual to individual, creeping 
in through the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets 
or like the capillary oozing of water but which, if you give them 
time, will rend the hardest monuments of men’s pride. ’William James
From inception, civil society associations have been 
heavily engaged in economic activity. Recently, under the 
banner of social enterprise, those activities have been 
rediscovered and extended. Some find the label and 
discourse of social enterprise troubling and warn of threats 
to the essential values, as they see them, of civil society 
or the voluntary sector. Nevertheless, its proponents 
are essentially revisiting and re-invigorating a long and 
honourable tradition. 
Of course, the critics of social enterprise have a point: value-
based economic activity is problematic. Some initiatives will, in 
time, either fail economically or degenerate socially. Moreover, 
some of the economic activity involves engagement 
with the state, which makes it doubly problematic. 
Nevertheless, civil society associations can only go it alone up 
to a point. Often civil society can achieve its goals only with 
and through a degree of state action. Choosing purity over 
engagement simply risks a different sort of failure. Ultimately, 
to paraphrase Jane Mansbridge (1986), the fate of every 
social movement is to become either a sect or an institution. 
Radical political campaigns either fade away or learn to 
compromise with power. But this does not mean they face 
a choice between two forms of failure. Some changes are 
achieved and the shift to the centre opens up space for the 
next generation of radical initiatives. The same is often true 
in economic activity: the success of the building societies 
has also been their failure and a new generation of credit 
unions is now colonising the space they have vacated.
Currently, the opportunities for building up a civil economy 
seem to be greater than ever. The market and the state have 
both fallen off their pedestals. Civil society activity and social 
enterprise have far greater recognition, including cross-
party support. A new financial infrastructure to support civil 
society associations is developing. Bringing about change 
through disparate civil society initiatives resonates with 
modern social science and its understanding of nudges, 
networks and the evolution of complex adaptive systems.
Civil society is the new politics. Careers, including second 
careers, can be pursued within it – locally, nationally or 
globally. But when civil society initiatives become far-reaching, 
it is because they have come to incorporate and link up 
myriad small, local initiatives. These remain the essential 
source of people, expertise, information and legitimacy.  
It is the linkages that are crucial. Collaboration between 
civil society associations is needed to scale up activity 
and to present forceful and convincing cases for change. 
With companies and government, partnership is the 
watchword - but it is more a question than an answer. It 
needs constantly to be re-invented through a vigorous 
blend of challenge and collaboration. When larger civil 
society groupings tap into the energy and support of the 
many smaller ones they become a movement with both 
moral force and operational capacity; they can protest, 
and they can devise solutions and carry them into effect. 
Creating and sustaining these links will not be easy. But 
the new internet-based forms of networked organizing and 
participatory governance are still in their infancy. Coupled 
with the under-used organisational talent especially among 
older people, these developments hold out the prospect 
that the trend in the last 20 years for the civil economy to 
innovate, grow and strengthen will accelerate, not slacken.
Moreover, as an approach to social change, civil society 
activity does not ask people to be something other 
than they are. The networks they have, the know-how 
and the skills they already possess, the needs, interests 
and values that move them – these are where they 
begin, even if, through association and action, they are 
gradually drawn far beyond those starting points. 
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Charity – an organisation, trust or foundation established to 
pursue philanthropic objectives and providing some kind of 
public benefit. Charities are not owned by anyone, and are 
governed by trustees who are required to pursue the purposes 
for which the charity was established. In many countries, 
charities have certain tax privileges.
Community Interest Company (CIC) – a company that 
exists to provide some kind of community benefit through 
trading activity. This legal form was introduced to make it 
easier for groups wishing to establish a social enterprise, 
for whom neither a co-operative nor a charity (or the trading 
subsidiary of a charity) were suitable forms.
Co-operative – a member-owned and governed enterprise 
with a distinct legal form (involving registration under the 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act). The members of the 
co-operative are generally the beneficiaries of the services 
it provides – so customers are eligible to be members of 
consumer co-operatives, and the members of a housing 
co-operative are those who live in the dwellings owned by 
the co-operative; the members of agricultural co-operatives 
are farmers, the workforce are members of a workers’ co-
operative, and so on. Most co-operatives subscribe to the 
seven principles of the International Co-operative Alliance – 
these are voluntary, open membership, democratic control, 
economic returns in proportion to business conducted, 
autonomy and independence, member education, co-
operation among co-operatives, and concern for community. 
Mutual – an enterprise set up for the benefit of its members, but 
not running on co-operative principles. Mutual insurance societies 
have been particularly prominent in the US insurance industry.
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) – an independent 
organisation that is also not a for-profit business. This term is 
widely used in international development contexts, but refers 
to what would be called voluntary organisations or third-sector 
organisations in the UK, or non-profits in the US.
Non-profit organisation/non-profit sector – a broad 
category of independent organisations whose primary purpose 
is something other than making money. This is a US term that 
encompasses both charitable and non-charitable organisations 
(for example, sports and social clubs) but tends not to include 
co-operatives and churches. A defining characteristic is the 
non-distribution constraint, which prevents surpluses being 
appropriated by those controlling the organisation. It is roughly 
equivalent to the UK term ‘voluntary organisation/voluntary 
sector’, but, reflecting different institutional histories, the US 
non-profit sector is much larger, including some hospitals, 
universities and major cultural organisations. 
Social economy – that part of the economy comprised of co-
operatives, mutuals, associations and foundations, to use the 
institutional definition of the European Union. However, most 
people would agree that a social enterprise that does not use 
one of these legal forms (preferring a CIC form, perhaps) would 
still be part of the social economy. In the UK, the term ‘third 
sector’ (see below) is more common. 
Social enterprise – a business with primarily social objectives 
whose surpluses are largely reinvested for that purpose in the 
business or community, rather than being driven by the need to 
maximise profit for shareholders and owners (to use the Office 
of the Third Sector’s definition – there are many others, but 
usually the differences do not matter). A social enterprise can 
be established under several different legal forms – as a co-
operative, a CIC, a company limited by guarantee or as a charity 
(private enterprises and public organisations can likewise be 
constituted using several different legal frameworks). 
Social entrepreneur – someone seen as behaving in 
entrepreneurial ways but for social purposes. The literature 
distinguishes two broad types – those who have, or are 
aiming to, set up new social enterprises, and those aiming to 
introduce, or who have introduced, some social innovation. 
Such an innovation may be in or around the public sector, or 
work across sectors, but is not primarily about establishing a 
particular social enterprise.
Social sector – another broad term currently gathering favour 
in the US, perhaps as a more positive way of referring to the 
non-profit sector. The term independent sector is still also used 
sometimes. None of these terms has a precise definition, any 
more than do the private sector or the public sector.
Third sector – a broad-brush way of referring to the space 
between the public and private sectors, and to the sorts of 
organisations that are neither public organisations nor for-profit 
businesses. More specifically, it provides a way of referring 
to both the voluntary and community sector and social 
enterprises, at the same time and in a succinct phrase. In 
Europe, the term social economy would often be used instead.
Voluntary organisation – any independent association, but the 
term is most often used to refer to agencies and community-
based organisations working in humanitarian, social welfare 
and cultural activity. The word voluntary, in this context, has 
nothing to do with volunteers, though of course many voluntary 
organisations do work with and through volunteers.
Appendix 1: Terminology 
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The material below is a reconstruction of 
 ideas from, or stimulated by, a workshop at 
which participants were invited to engage in  
an exercise in wishful theorising. They were 
asked to imagine that ‘the 800lb gorilla of  
global capitalism’ had been ‘house-trained’ by 
civil society. The question was: how might this 
(most plausibly) have come about? Participants 
were asked to sketch out narrative fragments: 
as if passages from some future history written 
about 2030. Nothing was included for which there 
was not some precedent or an evidenced trend. 
Appendix 2: Fragments from 
a future history 
Facilitation
Rob Paton
Chris Cornforth
Roger Spear
Participants
Rajeeb Dey 
Phillip Blond 
Ravinol 
Chambers 
Jude English 
Lee Esterhuizen 
Helen Kersley 
Richard Paton 
Matthew Pike 
Andrea Westall 
Vivien Woodell
Workshop participants
The turning point
What became known as the crunch years – the belated 
global carbon alarm combined with the depression of 
2009-13 – was the turning point for the prodigal societies 
of Euramerica. The historical puzzle is how the UK 
managed to land on its feet. Why did Britain avoid the 
disintegration, social polarisation, the reversion to statism 
and the spasms of ineffectual authoritarianism that befell 
other parts of the European Union? How did a society 
that lamented the way it was time-poor find so many 
people willing to put in the long hours needed for social 
and economic governance? If (as some political scientists 
now claim) these years saw a new political settlement take 
shape, this was hard to discern amid the turbulence and 
spasmodic social unrest of those years … 
… The challenges were not just economic and 
technological: they undermined the basic tenets of a 
shared political culture. It has to be recognised, for 
example, that in those days the idea of a level playing field 
in the economic arena was still tied to idealised versions of 
a free market. The long struggle to penalise the production 
of widely acknowledged bad by-products and to reward 
and facilitate the provision of agreed good by-products 
was, in those days, seen as aimed at distorting the 
proper functioning of the market, as a damaging restraint 
on enterprise and a provision of subsidies for otherwise 
unviable businesses. As far as Treasury mandarins and 
their agents across Whitehall were concerned, any shaping 
of the market had first to be justified by demonstrating a 
specific and exceptional market failure. To suggest that free 
markets routinely failed in some respects while succeeding 
in others showed, like talking about death or sex in polite 
company, that the speaker was not ‘sound’ … 
… But it would be quite wrong to say that the crisis in 
itself forced new thinking and made decision-makers listen 
to new voices promoting more realistic and value-based 
principles for economic organisation and governance. 
Many clung to the old beliefs with the tenacity of 
fundamentalists. More importantly, however, the challenges 
were not resolved in Whitehall, but by animateurs across 
society. As social scientists had been noticing, the gradual 
spread of post-conventional value orientations meant that 
leadership and civic entrepreneurship were increasingly 
diffused through society.18 Once sufficiently enraged or 
inspired, these animateurs were too impatient to rely 
on traditional politics and turned instead to the growing 
professional, technological, social and financial support 
infrastructure that had been built up to foster independent 
social sector initiatives.19 In so far as they had a common 
outlook, it was ‘live the change’, and those years saw a 
proliferation of creative (as well as not so creative) initiatives 
at all levels of society. This chapter recalls some of the 
ways in which the new modes of economic governance 
and distributed social regulation have come about …
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The evolution of networked governance
Well before the crunch years, both the United Nations 
and the European Union had created new spaces for civil 
society to join in the processes of global and transnational 
governance. At the same time, fluid coalitions of celebrity, 
faith, philanthropy, activism and sections of the media were 
emerging to challenge orthodoxy on specific issues.20 The 
influence that could be achieved through these arenas and 
in these ways was limited as long as the terms of debate 
were framed by neo-liberal assumptions. When these 
were discredited and governments, led by the Obama 
administration, took serious steps to regulate commercial 
lobbyists, the opportunities for global civil society suddenly 
increased. Usually possessing some combination of 
expertise, legitimacy and clout, its proposals on carbon 
reduction, tax justice, the arms trade and the regulation of 
financial flows were suddenly being taken seriously. The 
Tobin Tax was introduced in 2012; primitive licensing of the 
production and trade in small arms was introduced in 2014 
(and then revisited every seven years since); tax havens 
were effectively outlawed by 2016 after a second global 
convention and treaty. In all of these, and the continuing 
stream of transnational initiatives to reduce carbon 
emissions, precipitate oceanic carbon, trap CO2 and 
bring population growth under control, global civil society 
played crucial advocacy and mediation roles. Another 
milestone was the Edinburgh Agreement of 2020, which 
effectively set out the guiding principles for the single social 
market – in terms of tighter energy caps and trading, the 
oversight of corporate behaviour, triune accounting, the 
co-production of welfare services, and so on …
… Writing in 2030, we take it for granted that global and 
European governance are exercised through a network 
of multi-stakeholder deliberative forums engaging civil 
society associations, business and governments – even if 
everything is nominally still a matter of intergovernmental 
agreement. But it took time for world leaders to accept 
that workable regulatory ideas and frameworks emerge 
through extended conversations in intranational and 
international policy networks.21 The role of government 
leaders – pointing to the adaptive challenges, insisting that 
they are addressed, occasionally unblocking the process – 
is still crucial. But now, even media commentators realise 
that generalist politicians haggling over newly improvised 
clauses on complex issues at three in the morning rarely 
deliver wise pronouncements … 
… A similar trend started in the UK when the Cameron 
government, learning the lessons of its predecessor, made 
serious efforts to restrain its own cravings for short-term 
media reactivity, staged initiatives, centralised target-
setting and other such command-and-control posturing. 
Later, the introduction of proportional representation 
(following the hung parliaments of 2017-18) reinforced 
a slow, always erratic, shift away from Whitehall 
managerialism. Nevertheless, the idea that government’s 
primary domestic role is to oversee the architecture of 
governance and to uphold high-level frameworks for 
strategy, policy and public finance remains controversial. 
Many still think it is the job of cabinet ministers to sort out 
whatever the press say is today’s problem – as the recent 
row over the prime ministerial adviser who was quoted as 
telling ministers: ‘Don’t just do something, stand there,’ 
showed. But the spirited public defence by most civil 
society leaders of the wisdom within this remark is itself 
indicative of the shift in thinking that has occurred …
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Social policy and the growth of the third sector
Socialising finance
… The growth of the third sector, already a 20-year 
trend, accelerated during the crunch years. Stalled by the 
collapse of the commercial property market, regeneration 
schemes took a much more bottom-up character … The 
introduction of personal budgets for social care – a £35 
billion market – was a powerful boost towards the co-
production of public services, across a wide range of fields 
from custodial services through workfare to the well-being 
industry and community integration … 
… The reinvention of friendly societies for the 21st century 
was stimulated by the Cameron government’s introduction 
of the option to capitalise social benefits so long as this 
was approved by a peer group.22 But these (and other) 
locally-based societies became the vehicle for disparate 
initiatives from self-build housing co-operatives to carbon 
reduction projects (for example, combined heat and power 
on Scandinavian lines) to LETS schemes and real food 
clubs … Less obvious in this upsurge of activity was the 
gradual clarification of the various symbiotic relationships 
between grassroots and larger third-sector organisations. 
Tensions abound still, of course, since they are inherent 
in the differences of role and perspective. But a greater 
recognition of the mutual dependence, informed by a better 
understanding of what each can and cannot do, developed 
steadily through a series of initiatives led by the Grassroots 
Alliance for Social Progress … 
… The steady co-evolution of social enterprise and 
compatible institutions of social finance had been under 
way for a couple of decades before the crunch years 
accelerated the process … Initially, the urgent need 
to provide credit to small businesses and restart the 
mortgage market led to the Post Office and Northern 
Rock (a successful building society-turned-unsuccessful 
bank) being redirected to provide new services – lending 
to small businesses through chamber of commerce-
supported loan clubs, expanding the capacity and reach 
of community finance institutions, and acting as an agent 
to handle local authority mortgage lending. Later, when 
the Housing Corporation ceased to be both regulator 
and funder to the social housing sector, Northern Rock 
became one of the three recognised specialist finance 
houses. Then, in 2017, these strands of activity were 
brought together in the Rock Solid community banking 
brand that is now familiar …
… During this time, too, social impact bonds started 
to be sold on an increasingly large scale, targeted at 
specific issues of social concern. The first, issued by 
Triodos Bank in 2011, concerned a scheme to reduce 
recidivism among young offenders through creating and 
running three purpose-built establishments (including 
secure accommodation) in major urban areas. Faced with 
the need to renew the overcrowded prison estate, the 
Treasury was delighted when a social enterprise offered 
to build and run some new capacity (PFIs, a baroque 
financial arrangement to secure private capital for public 
purposes, had been fatally undermined by the credit 
crunch). The Treasury had nothing to lose: it agreed to 
pay standard running costs plus (four years in arrears) an 
attractive premium based on half of the savings arising 
from any demonstrated reduction in recidivism. In fact, 
these Neway Centres attracted the cream of the prison 
and probation services (frustrated by the restrictions of 
working in a massive, dysfunctional bureaucracy) and after 
some initial wobbles became an unambiguous success. 
The Neway approach was quickly replicated elsewhere, 
sometimes by other social enterprises and sometimes by 
joint ventures between private companies and civil society 
organisations (who had the ideas, know-how, community 
roots and values) … 
... Equally important was the concept of social impact 
bonds themselves. The precise arrangements varied, but 
the general idea was straightforward: a public service 
business, based on some more or less predictable 
income streams, was financed by investors attracted 
by a combination of market-related financial returns and 
a clearly associated social benefit; the main risks were 
carried by a first tier of social venture capital funding23 … 
By 2022, Rock Solid’s People’s Pension fund had joined in 
financing close to 1,000 schools through its purchase of 
Community Education Bonds … However, this was only 
one among several developments – not least of which was 
the wider acceptance of instruments of Islamic finance 
– this meant that the Social Stock Exchange, launched 
rather optimistically in 2012, slowly built up the constituency 
of individual, organisational and institutional investors to 
ensure a reasonable degree of liquidity. Once investors 
were reassured that the inflow of replacement investors was 
sufficient to (more or less) assure they could get their funds 
out again, the SSE really started to take off … 
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The three Ms – morality and mutualism in markets
... Powerful customer-facing brands – exemplified 
by the large supermarket chains – were the ultimate 
commanding height of the early 21st-century economy. 
The consumer ambivalences generated by market 
behaviour largely free of moral encumbrances and social 
ties were increasingly apparent: the devotion to bargains 
co-existed with regular spasms of outrage over food 
adulteration and contamination, dishonest labelling and 
advertising, child and migrant labour scandals, suicides 
among independent farmers reduced to penury, the 
destruction of town centres, fat-cat salaries, tax evasion 
and environmental crimes of all sorts – from over-fishing 
to the destruction of tropical forests. Challenged by the 
depression of the crunch years, the ethical consumer 
movement reached out not just to trade unions (through 
the Living Wage marque) but to the increasingly influential 
Radical Traditionalists in the Conservative party, who 
sided with small businesses of all forms against big 
business, urged one-nation social policies and saw 
conservation as a cornerstone of conservatism. Many new 
certification schemes were introduced, including several 
phoney labels created by large companies attempting 
to whitewash their existing practices. Not surprisingly, 
shoppers found the proliferation of different certification 
schemes tiresome and confusing (for organics, Fairtrade, 
living wage, ecological sustainability, supervised supply 
chains, healthy eating, work integration, local suppliers, 
livestock welfare, OK finance, etc.). In response, the 
Ethical Brands Convention of 2015 led to the introduction 
of the civil society kitemark. This was an umbrella label 
with gold, silver and bronze levels for products and, more 
significantly, for stores and store chains, as a whole (the 
latter based on the proportion of goods sold that met 
the requisite standard). It was supported by a sustained 
marketing and media campaign and turned out to be just 
what many consumers wanted – a reliable way to simplify 
their purchasing decisions. Less immediately visible, but 
at least as important, was the adoption of civil society 
purchasing standards by public organisations following 
a joint statement from the Audit Commission and the 
NAO saying, through the usual circumlocutions, that 
the civil society kitemark could reasonably and indeed 
often should be used as a significant positive indication 
in public-sector purchasing decisions … Before long, the 
Co-op, Waitrose and Marks & Spencer were engaged 
with civil society accreditation. In 2020, Sainsbury’s and 
B&Q joined them, with a hesitant Tesco three years later. 
Wal-mart/Asda’s opposition was only overcome when 
the government stepped in with a new tax regime for 
non-kited retailers as part of the comprehensive review of 
Company Law in 2025 …
… All this depended on three decades of steady progress 
in social accounting and auditing, facilitated by online 
collaborative tools for logging, collating and verifying data. 
This work was boosted by the development of carbon 
accounting as a consequence of the Copenhagen Treaty 
of 2010 and came together in the Triune Accounting 
Protocol of 2021, signed off by all the major accountancy 
bodies. Arguably, too, the enhanced legal protection and 
civil society support for whistleblowers also helped change 
the climate inside companies; those tempted to falsify their 
records discovered that this was more difficult to conceal 
than they had realised … 
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The public domain: culture, the media and technology
The revitalisation of the public domain was not just a 
result of the emergence of the blogsphere – important 
though that obviously was. The use of vacant commercial 
property pioneered by Arts Space was copied by 
others, including community activists pursuing various 
enthusiasms … The growth of community media was 
accelerated by their gaining public funds – first through 
a BBC effort to head off the inevitable, and later by the 
new funding regime for public service broadcasting … 
Progressive philanthropy networks were another source 
of funding for investigative web journalism, as it was 
for political edu-tainment about complex issues, or for 
satirists to ridicule the pompously powerful and out-of-
touch. When the Press Complaints Commission ruled 
that it would draw on the findings of civil society fact-
checker websites (such as the Guardian-sponsored 
BadScience.org.uk and the university-sponsored wiki 
currentmediaporkies.ac.uk) in responding to complaints, 
this both boosted the work of these groups, and began to 
rein in the worst excesses of PR cant, wishful commercial 
thinking and plain nonsense in the mainstream media 
(later, the journalists unions and professional bodies 
threatened to withdraw accreditation from egregious 
repeat offenders). None of this stopped people from 
denying the Holocaust or believing AIDS had nothing to 
do with HIV, if they wished to, but it did do something to 
restrain sensation-seeking editors from giving space and 
credibility to absurd, dangerous and offensive views, and 
to institutionalise the right of reply … 
Such developments were part of a broader trend that saw 
the key skills of web technology spread through society, a 
trend which was, arguably, inherently democratising. The 
clearest case in point was the development of distributed 
models of information security and identity-confirmation 
(through largely open source means) and orchestrated by 
trusted civil society brands like the Phone Co-operative 
and Nationwide. Philosophically, this approach was far 
more congenial to the Cameron government – quite apart 
from the fact that the National ID card scheme had, as 
predicted, turned into a multi-billion pound black hole with 
no end in sight …
… As ever, sport and music formed the basis for other 
cross-cutting communities. The world-famous Somerset 
Universal Festival of Inspirational and Sacred Music – 
where West African drummers, chanting Buddhists, 
Hindu incantations, whirling Dervishes and gospel choirs 
meet English choral music (and much else besides) – had 
originated as the Glastonbury rock festival. It gradually 
morphed, through world music, into its current form, after a 
younger member of the family who owned the Glastonbury 
site visited Fez one June. Some say this was important in 
taking inter-faith discussions beyond the worthily middle-
aged, and even making them rather cool … 
Regressive tendencies, social tensions and outbursts of conflict 
It would be quite wrong to think that civil society was the 
preserve of thoughtful, public-spirited and far-sighted 
citizens. In fact, every kind of Marxist, Islamist, white 
supremacist, eco-terrorist and Christian cult was preaching 
the coming of their version of the millennium or doomsday. 
But as the 9/11 Truth Campaign had vividly shown, despite 
there being many incarnations of widespread and keenly 
felt social alienation and distrust, these groups had as 
much difficulty engaging effectively with each other as they 
had with the mainstream. Explosions of angry protest over 
migrant workers, petrol prices, factory closures, home 
repossessions, rail ticket prices, sex offenders, hospital 
closures – as well as various ethnic and religious divisions 
– would lead to the formation of new campaigning groups. 
Some of these gained months or even years of media 
notoriety (through staged spectacular acts of sabotage, 
or the winning of mayoral contests or by-elections), but 
most withered quite quickly or morphed into something 
more constructive as they were drawn into a web of related 
campaigns or local and regional alliances … 
… The reasons why Britain failed to develop a nasty 
right-wing party capable of more than passing electoral 
success are still hotly debated. It has been argued that 
the Daily Mail fulfilled an important expressive function 
in this respect. Others argue that civil society itself was 
able to absorb and contain intolerance and hostility. On 
this view, the spread of multi-stakeholder governance 
and partnership working, various community planning, 
mediation and integration schemes, and forms of citizen 
juries were important. They meant that facilitation, 
consensus-building and conflict resolution skills were 
widely diffused through society. Others make a similar 
point, but argue that feminism and the increased 
participation of women better explain why discussions that 
would once, invariably, have been marked by adversarial 
stances, polarisation and/or resigned acquiescence could 
now be conducted much more often through dialogue and 
deliberation … 
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The ‘dirty’ industries and moral rearmament  
Abandoning its nuclear deterrent was bound to be difficult 
for any government – even if privately many politicians had 
been saying for years that they wished they could see how 
to get rid of it. The Obama administration’s willingness to 
put disarmament back on the agenda helped, of course, 
but it was still a shock to many when the Cameron 
administration announced a review of the independent 
deterrent. At this point, a network of retired generals and 
admirals campaigning openly against Trident (and with 
the tacit support of many senior officers) played a critical 
role in reassuring the British public that the country would 
be more, not less, secure by diverting the funds to other 
forms of both hard and soft power … Former members 
of the armed forces were also increasingly visible among 
a number of other campaigns – against landmines, small 
arms and collusion in torture. The shift in the role of the 
armed forces – from straightforward war-fighting to a mix 
of peacemaking, peacekeeping and international policing, 
often undertaken in collaboration with NGOs and local 
traditional institutions – had made the acquisition of new 
competences and thinking by officers an urgent, even life-
and-death, matter.24 This may explain why, though cruder 
views remain widespread, the armed forces now also 
contain a sizeable and vocal tough love subculture (see, 
for example, the Compassionate Warrior blog that has 
been running since 2016 and the chivalrousgrunts group 
on Facebook formed in 2020) …
… These years also saw the gradual reconstruction of 
BAE Systems. This had been a major arms manufacturer. 
It become a national embarrassment as government 
efforts to conceal its corrupt practices gradually unravelled 
and as its over-ambitious expansion plans ran into 
the sand and its share price trickled ever downwards. 
Unfortunately, no one knew what to do with it, especially 
at a time of high unemployment. Hence, the emergence 
of a credible green conversion initiative, led by the trade 
unions and professional staff association, was widely 
welcomed. In an initiative strongly redolent of the Lucas 
Aerospace Shop Stewards a generation earlier, the skilled 
workforce eager to showcase their high-tech system 
development skills (and worried about their jobs) started 
producing designs for new offshore energy technologies, 
carbon deposition devices and novel transport systems. 
But they did so publicly under Creative Commons 
licences, attracting the creativity and energy of frustrated 
engineers around the world (somewhat similar initiatives 
had been under way for some time in biotech fields). The 
Board of Directors was outraged by this challenge to 
their strategic insight (however discredited), but clumsy 
efforts to identify and discipline those responsible only 
led to conflict and a loss of confidence throughout the 
organisation. In this atmosphere, BAE Systems failed to 
win a major contract it had been betting on, leaving it 
open to short-selling by hedge funds based in Moscow, 
Shanghai and Brazil. At this point, a consortium of 
progressive financiers stepped in and bought a sizeable 
slice of the company for a song. They proposed that the 
company be split between Royal Ordnance work and 
a new division of British Alternative Energy Systems. 
Whether this had really been orchestrated by the ageing 
Lord Mandelson (or he just wanted some of the credit) 
is unclear. In any event, the coalition government, 
desperately concerned lest Britain lose out completely 
in the race to develop new green industries, immediately 
invited BAE Systems to discussions on this proposal …
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Governance as civil society; civil society as governance
... Research has shown that nearly all households are 
now involved, directly or indirectly, in some kind of 
consultative network or collaborative decision-making 
– though many of these take place online. Although 
social scientists continue to trade rival explanations, 
some trends and factors are not in dispute. The rise in 
unemployment meant that many people with, or seeking 
to develop, relevant skills were available to groups who 
needed to enlist bands of volunteers – or e-volunteers 
– to pursue their causes. And, in fact, the web turned 
out to be crucial in reducing the transaction costs of 
governance: the proliferation of new activist initiatives 
required an army of enthusiasts (some were obsessives, 
of course, but many were just willing hands, glad to have 
a recognised part to play in an undertaking they believed 
worthwhile). The trick was to develop methods of social 
web-working that were less demanding than open source 
production and more controlled than the early wikis – but 
still provided fun, recognition, responsibility and learning 
opportunities. As this became better understood from 
about 2010 onwards, it turned out not to be too difficult 
to catch the attention of passing surfers, stimulate a latent 
interest and develop it into a commitment and even a 
new strand of identity … The home-working obligation 
of 2013 (requiring employers to enable home working 
unless it could be shown to be unfeasible) was also 
important. This was a means of relieving pressures on 
the public transport system, reducing carbon emissions 
and supporting family life – but it also had the effect of 
making it easier to join in community activity … It seems 
to have reinforced a pre-existing trend among third-
age citizens to put something back through community 
governance. Their willingness to do this, especially the 
unglamorous heavy lifting of treasurer and secretary roles, 
was absolutely essential, and their social and political 
skills were often far in advance of the younger public and 
private sector managers that they dealt with in partnership 
boards and committees … Interestingly, in different 
ways, this trend was reported from all levels of society – 
from the hometown associations of struggling diaspora 
communities through to the giving clubs of the well-heeled 
(a formation that seems to have started in California in the 
pre-crunch years) … 
The corporations and trading networks of global 
capitalism are as restlessly energetic and innovative 
as ever, but they have been house-trained, de-fanged, 
socialised and brought under effective oversight. They 
are now embedded within regulatory networks, are tied 
by norms of reciprocity with other business agents, and 
whatever their own views, are wary of being seen to 
disregard societal values and environmental limits that 
are vigorously overseen and upheld by the many small 
platoons that make up civil society’s vast army … 
Civil society and the ‘commanding heights’: The civil economy; past, present and future            The Open University
Commission of Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland
Supplementary report: Growing a more civil economy
www.futuresforcivilsociety.org
34 
Endnotes
1 Robert Owen was a social reformer and one of the founders of 
socialism and the co-operative movement.
2 All this is all an object lesson in what sociologists call the 
tendency to ‘isomorphism’. Organisations become alike: they 
adopt or conform to what are taken to be best practices in a 
given field (and in doing so they identify with the thinking and 
values out of which those practices developed). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) is the seminal article.
3 Co-production refers to services being jointly created by clients 
and providers – with service users active in finding solutions 
for themselves and each other, rather than each being the 
recipient of separate professional interventions. For a clear, 
succinct overview of the concept and how it has been enacted 
in different settings, see NEF (2008); or see Pestoff (2009).
4 According to Mabbet (2001), private business (industrial life 
offices) contributed to nationalisation through their ‘sale of 
poor value policies’. But mutuals were squeezed between 
two dominant rationales: ‘competition and the emphasis on 
consumer choice’, which ignored key features of mutuals like 
‘voice’, membership, and the reinforcing dynamic of dividends 
to member owners; and ‘statism’ in British public policy with its 
commitment to rationalisation and standardisation.
5 The key reference is Douthwaite (2002).
6 Likewise it illustrates ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production (to 
use the terms of Gibbons et al., 1994). Whereas Mode 1 is 
concentrated in independent research institutions, Mode 2 is 
socially distributed in an extended web of strategic alliances 
and collaborations, and supported through informal networks 
and communication systems.
7 The benefits of enhanced citizenship have been elaborated by 
Hirst (amongst others) in his radical discourse on associative 
democracy (Hirst, 1993).
8 For a discussion, see, for example, Pearson (2002).
9 Institutional entrepreneurship is a concept still in progress. 
Maguire et al. (2004) and Leca and Naccache (2006) provide 
useful examples and ways into the discussion among 
researchers.
10 The work of Elinor Ostrom – for example, Ostrom (1990) – is 
seminal. Schlager (2000) provides a useful overview of this line 
of work.
11 Unlike many other appropriate technology initiatives, the aim 
from the start was to ensure that the new technology became 
embedded in the local economy (Fisher, 2006, but see also the 
discussion in later issues). Its rapid take-up has evidently had 
such an impact that it is apparent in Kenya’s national income 
statistics. 
12 Microfinance is now an asset class and the sector supports its 
own publications and conferences – see for example, www.
microfinanceinsights.com/index.asp. 
13 Oscar Wilde said that socialism was impossible because there 
were not enough evenings in the week.
14 See www.avaaz.org/en and www.simpol.org.uk.
15 See www.schwabfound.org and www.ashoka.org.
16 For entertaining but constructive critiques of large public and 
private bureaucracies, see Seddon (2005) and the various 
publications of Triarchy Press (www.triarchypress.co.uk/index.
htm).
17 Those who still think the state can just retreat and wither need 
to explain why there was absolutely no sign of this even after 
25 years of neo-liberal dominance. Indeed, never before had so 
many lobbying bees buzzed round the government honey pots 
in London and Washington. See, for example, Gamble (1988) 
and Crouch (2004). 
18 Of course, not all such leaders displayed post-conventional 
thinking – indeed, as always, some were more or less 
pre-conventional beneath a veneer of social acceptability. 
Interestingly, in those days this distinction was mainly the 
preserve of moral psychologists and, in consequence, much 
social commentary and analysis was given over to confused 
arguments about whether the increased individualism was 
social progress or social pathology. 
19 A colourful account of one such body is provided in 
Esterhuizen, et al., UnLtd – the first 25 years (London: Just 
Books cic 2027). There were many others, both local (The 
Scarman Trust’s ‘Can Do’ scheme was exemplary), national 
and international (for example, the Schwab and Ashoka 
fellowships).
20 Jubilee 2000 – the ‘drop the debt’ campaign – exemplified 
many of these developments. 
21 Except in the Netherlands, of course, where comparable 
processes had been institutionalised for years – see for 
example: A. Hollander, How Europe is going Dutch (London: 
Polity Press, 2018)
22 This was an idea borrowed from ‘Europe’ (Spain and Italy). 
23 Unfamiliar with these types of business and with entrepreneurs 
whose motivations they did not understand, the conventional 
banking system had exaggerated the risks and avoided this 
sort of lending. As Venturesome and other early initiatives 
discovered, default rates were quite low.
24 For example, British Army soldiers had been studying Open 
University materials on war, intervention and development 
even as they struggled with the confused realities of Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
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The working definition of civil society adopted  
by the Commission of Inquiry is:
Civil society as associational life: civil society is the 
‘space’ of organised activity voluntarily undertaken, and 
not undertaken by either the government or for-private-
profit business. This includes formal organisations 
such as voluntary and community organisations, 
faith-based organisations, trade unions, mutuals 
and co-operatives. It also includes informal groups, 
from the very local to global social movements.
It is important to note that all civil society associations are 
not necessarily ‘good’ in and of themselves. As noted by 
Tom Carothers, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace: ‘Civil society is the good, the bad and the downright 
bizarre.’ At their best, civil society associations can 
fundamentally enhance the lives of the poorest in society, 
strengthen democracy and hold the powerful to account. 
At their worst, they can preach intolerance and violence. 
Civil society as a ‘good’ society: the term civil society 
is often used as shorthand for the type of society we want 
to live in; these visions are both numerous and diverse.
Civil society associations can, and do, play a critical 
role in creating a good society. However, they will not 
achieve this alone. Creating a good society is dependent 
on the actions of and interrelationships between the 
market, states and civil society associations. 
Civil society as the arenas for public deliberation: 
people will not all necessarily agree what a ‘good’ society 
is or agree on the means of getting there. Civil society 
is therefore also understood as the arenas for public 
deliberation where people and organisations discuss 
common interests, develop solutions to society’s most 
pressing problems and ideally reconcile differences 
peacefully. These arenas are a key adjunct to a 
democratic society. They may be actual – a community 
centre, for example – or virtual, such as a blog.
In short, civil society is a goal to aim for (a ‘good’ 
society), a means to achieve it (associational 
life) and a means for engaging with one another 
about what a good society looks like and how 
we get there (the arenas for public deliberation). 
What is civil society? 
‘ Civil society is the good, the bad and the downright bizarre. ’ 
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